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293 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Neb. 2003)
L Facts
Charles Jess Palmer (Palmer") was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death
three times for the 1979 capital felonymurder of Eugene Zimmerman.' Palmer's
first two convictions were reversed on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of
Nebraska.2 In 1984, a jury tried and convicted Palmer for the third time, and a
three-judge panel sentenced him to death.' In accordance with section 29-
2522(3) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, the panel conducted a proportionality
review in which it compared Palmer's case to all other murder cases since 1973.'
The panel concluded that Palmer's death sentence was proportionate to the
sentences in the other murder cases.5 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska also performed a proportionality review.6 Unlike the sentencing
panel's review, the appellate proportionalityreview compared Palmer's case only
to other death penaltycases. The court held that Palmer's sentence was propor-
tional and affirmed his conviction and death sentence.8
On January 28, 2000, Palmer filed a federal habeas petition in the United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska.9 Palmer argued that the
1. Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017-18 (D. Neb. 2003).
2. Id at 1020; seeState v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648,654-55 (Neb. 1981) (reversing Palmer's
first conviction due to hypnotically, induced testimony); State v. Palmer, 338 N.W.2d 281,282 (Neb.
1983) (reversing Palmer's second conviction due to a violation of spousal privilege).
3. Pa/mr, 293 F. Supp. at 1022, 1025.
4. Id at 1025; see NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-2522(3) (2003) (stating that the sentencing panel
shall consider "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant").
5. Pamr, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
6. Id at 1026; see NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (1995) (requiring the Supreme Court of
Nebraska to "determine the propriety of the sentence in each case involving a criminal homicide
by comparing such case with previous cases involving the same or similar circumstances," and
forbidding the imposition of any sentence "greater than those imposed in other cases with the same
or similar circumstances"); State v. Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706, 737-38 (Neb. 1986) (discussing the
court's proportionality review).
7. Pabw, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1026. At the time the Supreme Court of Nebraska conducted
its proportionalityreview, then- ChiefJustice Krivosha vigorouslydissented to the majority's method
of comparison. Palnw, 399 N.W.2d at 738-55 (Neb. 1986) (Krivosha, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
8. Palnr, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1026.
9. Id at 1028; sw 28 U.S.C S 2254 (2000) (setting forth the requirements for seeking federal
habeas relief; part of AEDPA). In his federal habeas petition, Palmer asserted numerous other
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improper proportionalityreview performed bythe Supreme Court of Nebraska
violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.1" The district court
considered whether the appellate proportionality paradigm comparing death
sentences only to other death sentences was illogical and whether Palmer's due
process rights were violated."
II. Hdding
The district court held that the Supreme Court of Nebraska's reformulated
proportionality review violated both state and federal law by effectively
resentencing Palmer and denying him his right to meaningful appellate review.1
The court found that the appellate method of comparison violated Palmer's due
process rights by rendering the proportionality review meaningless. 3 Thus, the
district court held that the Supreme Court of Nebraska's proportionality review
comparing death sentences only to other death sentences was unconstitutional
and commuted Palmer's death sentence to life in prison. 4
IIL A ")s is
A. Proper Ciarison
Nebraska law entitles defendants who receive a death sentence to a propor-
tionality review at the sentencing level and a mandatory review at the state
supreme court level.1" Palmer claimed that his due process and Eighth Amend-
ment rights were violated "because the Supreme Court of Nebraska failed to
conduct a proper proportionality review."16 The district court explained that
"[wjhile the federal Constitution does not mandate a proportionalityreview, once
one is in place it must be conducted consistentlywith the Due Process Clause." 7
In K/gore u Bowesac, is the Eighth Circuit stated that due process is satisfied when
constitutional claims that willnot be discussed in this case note. Pdarrr, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1032-39.
10. Pamr, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1040; sw U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting the infliction
of "cruel and unusual punishments"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting states from
"depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
11. Palnzr, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-43.
12. Id at 1041-42.
13. Id at 1043.
14. Id at 1042-44, 1067.
15. Id at 1040; sw NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-2522(3) (2003) (requiring the sentencing panel to
perform a proportionality review); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (1995) (mandating that the
Supreme Court of Nebraska perform a proportionality review on direct appeal).
16. Palnrr, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
17. Id (citing Kilgore v. Bowersox, 124 F.3d 985, 996 (8th Cir. 1997)).
18. 124 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 1997).
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a state's proportionality review compares a defendant's case to sirrla cases. 9
The comparison required byNebraska law is supposed to entail an examination
of" 'all criminal homicides ... with the same or similar circumstances,' " not
similar penalties.20 A proper comparison of cases with similar circumstances
" 'compensate[s] for the lack of uniformity in charges which are filed' " and
ensures similar results.2 Thus, the Supreme Court of Nebraska's comparison of
Palmer's case to other death sentence cases was clearly an improper attempt to
reformulate the requirements of section 29-2521.01.22 The district court held
that the state supreme court's failure to compare Palmer's case to all similar
homicides, rather than just those cases that resulted in a death sentence, violated
Palmer's due process rights and denied him "meaningful appellate review."23
The district court further stated that Nebraska's two-tiered proportionality
review system was unconstitutional because it was "arbitrarilyappled."24 In State
v Sinwi s the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that it would compare" 'each
capital case under review with those previous cases in which the death penalty
has or hs not been imposed' " in order to prevent the arbitrary application of
death sentences.26 By comparing death sentences onlyto other death sentences,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska denied Palmer meaningful review and thereby
facilitated the arbitrary application of his death sentence.27 The United States
19. Pa/rr, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1041; Kdmre, 124 F.3d at 996. This comparison can be
narrowly tailored such that a murder committed during a robberyis compared onlyto other cases
involving a murder committed during a robbery. Id (citing Hallv. Luebbers, 296 F.3d 685,700 (8th
Gr. 2002)).
20. Id (alteration in original (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-2521.01 (1995)); sePa/r-, 399
N.W.2d at 747 (Krivosha, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Nebraska law
clearly requires the state supreme court "to determine whether the imposition of the death penalty
in the case on appeal is more severe than that imposed in other cases having same or similar
circumstances").
21. Parar, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-2521.01).
22. Id at 1041-42.
23. Id at 1042-43. The district court stated that "[h]ad a proportionality review been
properly performed in Palmer's case,... the result would have been fifty seven robbery/murders
to compare to Palmer's crime, onlysix of which resulted in a sentence of death" Id at 1042 (citing
Pam&rn, 399 N.W.2d at 752-53 (Krivosha, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
24. Id at 1043; seGregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (stating that the death penalty
may "not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner").
25. 250 N.W.2d 881 (Neb. 1977).
26. Pa/brw, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1042 (quoting State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881, 890 (Neb.
1977)).
27. Id The district court stated that "[flinding a sentence of death 'no greater than or
disproportionate to' another sentence of death is a fallacy since a death penalty cannot be 'greater
than or disproportionate to' another death sentence." Id (citing State v. Lotter, 586 N.W.2d 591,
638 (Neb. 1998) (ConnollyJ., concurring)).
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Supreme Court stated in Gafyu Ge, gOa that" 'the penalty of death may not
be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the
punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.' "29 The
district court stressed that "[1lirniting proportionality review to death sentence
cases is irrational and destroys the analytic value of proportionality review
itself."3" Thus, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court of
Nebraska's irrational method of proportionality review facilitated the arbitrary
application of the death penaltyin Palmer's case.3
B. > .Tid Reeaw Appd A r Rezemng
The district court noted that the purpose of Nebraska's two-tiered system
of proportionality review is to provide true appellate wdew of the sentencing
panel's analysis.32 Instead, "the Nebraska Supreme Court acted as an independ-
ent and unreviewable sentencing panel."33 By conducting its proportionality
analysis differently from the sentencing panel, the state supreme court denied
Palmer his statutory right to a two-tiered system of review." The district court
concluded that this method of review "amount[ed] to impermissible 'appellate
resentencing' in violation of the Due Process Clause."3" Rather than reviewing
the first proportionality determination, the Supreme Court of Nebraska essen-
tially resentenced Palmer under a newly created standard of comparison.36
Therefore, the district court held that by"act[ing] as an unreviewable sentencing
panel," the state supreme court denied Palmer his due process right to meaning-
ful appellate review.3
28. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
29. Palrr, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1042 (quoting Godfreyv. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,427 (1980));
se Ca 446 U.S. at 427 (prohibiting the imposition of the death penaltyunder arbitrary sentenc-
ing procedures); sw also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussing the Eighth Amendment's "implied] condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe
punishments").
30. Pa/nmr, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1042; se State v. Bey, 645 A.2d 685, 690 (N.J. 1994) (stating
that for proportionality review "the relevant universe of cases consists of those that are death
eligible").
31. Pa/mw, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1042-43.
32. Id at 1043 (citing Rust v. Hopkins, 984 F.2d 1486, 1493 (8th CAr. 1993)).
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id at 1043-44.
36. Id at 1044.
37. Pa&r, , 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1044.
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IV. Applatim in V zi, a
A. Tu&,TioedReuew
Nebraska's two-tiered system requires a proportionality review to be
performed by both the sentencing panel and the Supreme Court of Nebraska.38
In Virginia, the first opportunity for a defendant to receive a proportionality
review is bythe trial judge.39 Under section 19.2-264.5 of the Virginia Code, the
trial judge may "upon good cause shown" commute the defendant's death
sentence to life in prison.' A defendant can attempt to show cause byasserting
that his death sentence is disproportionate to sentences received in other cases
or by co-defendants in the same case."' However, the trial court is not required
to conduct a proportionality review. According to Yab v u ab,
42
the trial court may "declin[e] to exercise its discretionary authority" to consider
the proportionality of the defendant's sentence of death.43
In addition to the trial judge's discretionary proportionality review, the
Supreme Court of Virginia is required to perform a proportionality review in all
cases in which a death sentence has been imposed." Thus, depending on
whether or not the trial judge performs a proportionality review, Virginia's
system may be similar to Nebraska's two-tiered system. Palnwrprovides a clear
example of the problem that may exist in Virginia's proportionality review
process. To the extent that the trial judge mayconduct a proportionality review,
it may not be the same type of review performed by the Supreme Court of
Virginia. No standard exists that requires the two levels of review to use the
same criteria. Therefore, the Virginia system is plagued by the same flaw seen in
Nebraska's two-tiered system.
38. Se NEB. REV. STAT. 5 29-2522(3) (2003) (requiring the sentencing panel to perform a
proportionalityreview); NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-2521.03 (1995) (mandating that the Supreme Court
of Nebraska perform a proportionality review on direct appea).
39. S&- VA. CODE ANN. S19.2-264.5 (Michie 2000) (requiring the trial court -to thoroughly
investigate the historyof the defendant and anyand all other relevant facts, to the end that the court
may be fully advised as to whether the sentence of death is appropriate and just" before imposing
the sentence).
40. Id
41. Sw NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-2521.03 (requiring the Supreme Court of Nebraska to
"determine the propriety of the sentence in each case involving a criminal homicide by comparing
such case with previous cases involving the same or similar circumstances," and forbidding the
imposition of any sentence "greater than those imposed in other cases with the same or similar
circumstances").
42. 551 S.E2d 306 (Va. 2001).
43. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 306, 312 (Va. 2001).
44. SeVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(2) (Michie 2003) (stating that the Supreme Court of
Virginia shall "consider and determine... [wihether the sentence of death is excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant").
2004]
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B. Flamuai Qagnso PnroaxU
A defendant who is found guilty of capital murder but receives a life sen-
tence may appeal his sentence to the Court of Appeals of Virginia." When a
defendant receives a death sentence, the Supreme Court of Virginia automatically
reviews the sentence.' The court is required by section 17.1-313(C)(2) of the
Virginia Code to perform a proportionality review. 7 In performing its propor-
tionality review, the supreme court "may accumulate the records of all capital
felony cases tried within such period of time as the court may determine."4
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia apparently only compiles records of
capital cases that it has itself heard on appeal.4 The onlytime the supreme court
reviews a life sentence case is on a discretionary appeal, which is very rare."0
Therefore, because the supreme court only compiles records of cases that it
actually heard, very few life sentence cases are included in the records.
In addition, when the Court of Appeals of Virginia hears a life sentence case
on appeal, the issues that are appealed are not capital sentencing issues."1 As a
result, when the Supreme Court of Virginia does hear life sentence cases after
theyhave been appealed to the court of appeals, the record is bare on sentencing
issues. This lack of factual development leaves the supreme court with a record
devoid of sentencing data upon which a comparison could be made. 2 Thus,
even if the Supreme Court of Virginia does consider life sentence cases, such
cases will offer little guidance.
45. S&, VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-406(A)(i (Mchie 2003) (giving jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals of Virginia to hear appeals from any crime except those involving a death sentence).
46. S& VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-406(B) (granting jurisdiction over all death sentence appeals
to the Supreme Court of Virginia).
47. Sw VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C)(2) (requiring the Supreme Court of Virginia to
consider and determine whether a death sentence is proportionate to similar crimes and defen-
dans).
48. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(E).
49. Fora more complete discussion of this topic, segveamyKellyE.P. Bennettntiol
Retiew TheHisiad Appl imianDoded5, 12 CAP. DEF.J. 103 (1999).
50. See VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-406(A)(@ (giving jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals of
Virginia to hear appeals from any crime except those involving a death sentence).
51. Because a capital murder conviction can onlyresult in a death sentence or a life sentence,
no grounds exist to challenge a life sentence. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(A) (Mchie 2000)
(stating that "[w]hen the punishment of anyperson has been fixed at death ... the court may set
aside the sentence of death and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life").




C Whit Is &x Q~w Porifor Cv"ramicdt
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not limited its pool of cases for propor-
tionality comparison to cases decided under the current capital system53 If a
death sentence case is compared with other similar cases decided at a different
time, under different statutory or judicial guidelines, then the comparison is
unreliable. For example, in Sinm v South Cariin the United States Supreme
Court stated that due process requires that the jurybe instructed that life impris-
onment means life without the possibility of parole when the defendant's future
dangerousness is at issue.5 Significant changes in the death penaltysystem, such
as Smnom, should affect which cases are considered in a proportionality review.
The Supreme Court of Virginia should not compare current death sentence cases
with pre-Sinom cases because of the impact such a case has on the type of
sentences handed down. Proportionality review that is not confined to the
current capital context cannot provide a meaningful basis for comparison.
D. CaIw* Stm'anof cfah;dityReiew
Recent cases hint that the standard of proportionalityreviewin Virginia may
be changing.56 Twentyyears ago the court stated in Peteysonv Cown ze that
it conducted its proportionality review by comparing "the records in all capital
murder cases reviewed by this court."" Yet the court's list of examined cases
only included cases in which a death sentence was imposed.59 By 1999, the
Supreme Court of Virginia had begun to acknowledge that proportionalityreview
should "include not only those capital murder cases in which the death penalty
was imposed, but also those cases in which the trial court or jury imposed a life
sentence." ' However, the court neglected to consider numerous similar cases
that resulted in life sentences when performing its proportionality review."'
53. Sa ag, Yarbn*, 551 S.E.2d at 312 (listing cases that were considered during the court's
proportionality review, including Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 360 (1992), which was
decided prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154 (1994)).
54. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
55. Srna, 512 U.S. at 156.
56. SeePowell v. Com nwealth, 590 S.E.2d 537, 563 (Va. 2004) (stating that the Supreme
Court of Virginia's proportionality review included cases, such as Keil v. Commonwealh, 278
S.E2d 826 (Va. 1981), which resulted in life sentences).
57. 302 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 1983).
58. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520, 528 (Va. 1983).
59. Id
60. Orbe v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808, 816 (Va. 1999) (citing Whitleyv. Common-
wealth, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171 (Va. 1982)).
61. Se eg, Home v. Commonwealth, 339 S.E.2d 186, 187 (Va. 1986) (affirming a life
sentence for a defendant convicted of capital felony murder); Keil v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d
2004]
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Recently it appears that the Supreme Court of Virginia may be broadening the
base of cases examined in its proportionalityreviewprocess. InPozUdv Carm
uait/, 62 handed down on January 16, 2004, the court's proportionality review
included cases that resulted in life sentences. However, it is still unclear
whether the supreme court reviewed the trial court record or the court of appeals
record. In the latter case, of course, the proportionality review would be incom-
plete because of the absence of any sentencing data from the appeal.64
V. Cmtaion
Paln-r stands for the proposition that a proportionality review that com-
pares death sentences only to other death sentence cases is ineffective and
violates a defendant's due process rights. To ensure similar results, death sen-
tences must be compared to al homicide cases, including those that resulted in
a life sentence, with similar circumstances. Palnrralso highlights the similar flaws
that exist in Virginia's proportionality review system.
Jessie A. Seiden
826, 827 (Va. 1981) (same).
62. 590 S.E.2d 537 (Va. 2004).
63. Poudl, 590 S.E.2d at 563 (stating that the Supreme Court of Virginia "also considered
cases in which defendants received life sentences, rather than the death penalty, for capital murder
during the commission of rape or attempted rape"). Unlike other cases in which the court stated
that it considered life sentence cases, the court in Poum actuallycited Home and Ke1 as examples of
such cases. SeHem, 339 S.E.2d at 186 (affirning a life sentence for a defendant convicted of
capital felonymurder) and K64 278 S.E.2d at 826 (same). For a more complete discussion of PoUAd,
seTerrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 591 (2004) (analyzing Powell v. Commonwealth,
590 S.E.2d 537 (Va. 2004)). S abo Bums v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 896 (Va. 2001)
(citing Horne and Keg as examples of capital murder cases that resulted in life sentences).
64. Sees" Part IVN.B.
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